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Abstract  
Citizens are the target group of sustainability policies, and their acceptance and subsequent 
behavioral change are key in transition processes. But what drives citizens to accept new 
instruments that will be added to a pre-existing instrument mix? To answer this question, we 
suggest an innovative combination of sustainability transitions and social acceptance research, 
and examine the case of Swiss energy turnaround. We rely on data from a representative 
sample of the Swiss resident population. By estimating logistic multi-response models, we 
disentangle individual and context-related factors that drive instrument preferences in a 
instrument mix situation. We conclude that it is mainly individual factors (values in favor of 
nuclear phasing out and climate mitigation) that positively impact the acceptance of 
instruments that promote the larger energy transitions through renewables. Additionally, the 
self-contribution of citizens (energy pro-sumers) seems to shape preferences more than current 
policies of their own jurisdiction.    
 




 Citizens are the target group of sustainability policies, and their acceptance and 
subsequent behavioral change are key in transition processes 
 A combination of transitions studies and social acceptance allows for focus on 
citizens’ policy preferences in an instrument mix situation 
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1. Introduction   
The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of policies and politics in the 
context of larger sustainability transitions in general (see Rogge & Reichardt 2016), and the 
energy turnaround in particular. More specifically, we focus on the processes of policy 
instrument selection, i.e., the introduction of public measures to reach pre-defined targets of 
larger socio-technical transitions (Markard et al. 2016a, 2012; Smith et al. 2005). Today, it is 
crucial to consider the whole instrument mix, and thus the interplay of different policy 
measures, as policy goals are rarely achieved by single state interventions only (see also 
Edmondson et al. 2018). In this context we argue that citizens’ acceptance of policy instruments 
belonging to a wider instrument mix is a key driver to create necessary public understanding 
along with behavioral change and effective implementation. Research about energy policy in 
general, and renewable energy in particular, has repeatedly emphasized that a lack of social 
acceptance by communities or citizens is a crucial barrier to successful energy transition, as 
one example of fundamental sustainable transformation (Dermont et al. 2017; Wüstenhagen et 
al. 2007).  However,  most policy studies or research investigating socio-technical changes have 
focused largely on firms or the political elite (e.g., organizations and collective actors, see 
Markard et al. 2016a) when examining the role of actors in sustainable transitions 
(Fünfschilling & Truffer 2016; Geels 2002) and their reactions to state intervention (Markard et 
al. 2016a).   
We agree that social acceptance is one key aspect to understanding policy change as one 
important element of a larger socio-technical transformation. However, we argue that the 
exclusive focus on the political elite, firms, or utilities neglects the important role citizens and 
individuals play with respect to a successful sustainable transition. In fact, citizens and local 
communities are typically exposed to policy decisions made at the national or next higher 
institutional level. Thus, they are often the direct addressees of policy instruments and are 
expected to change their behavior so as to achieve politically defined targets. Their reactions 
towards policy instruments (e.g., acceptance but also potential opposition) are crucial for the 
successful implementation of policy instruments, and for the success of larger sustainability 
transitions. This is not only the case in contexts with strong direct-democratic institutions 
where citizens are decision-makers, but also in purely representative political systems in which 
fundamental change—such as a transition from a conventional to a renewable energy system—
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will not be feasible if the population does not support this change, at least to a certain degree 
(Steg et al. 2005). Such processes may take some time and evolve over time (Dreyer et al. 2015), 
and policies act as important triggers to raise public awareness about new technologies and 
also serve to induce behavioral change (e.g., citizens in their role as energy consumers or co-
producers; see also Wolsink 2012). Most often, policies and policy instruments in particular, 
are introduced on top of a pre-existing portfolio of state measures (Martin 2016; Flanagan et 
al. 2011). As mentioned above, and to understand citizens’ acceptance of policies promoting 
transition processes, we should not focus on single instruments, but rather on the configuration 
of policy instruments, i.e. instrument mix. 
In summary, we combine the context of larger energy transition with insights from social 
acceptance research. Through this novel combination, we account for the importance of 
citizens as target actors for the realization of energy transitions and ask the following question: 
What are citizens’ preferences towards new instruments promoting renewables in a 
instrument mix situation, and what factors influence these instrument mix preferences?   
Our present study contributes to the literature in three respects. First, theoretically and 
conceptually, we try to fill the research gap in transitions studies by making use of insights 
about citizens’ policy preferences from the social acceptance literature. More concretely, this 
not only provides the conceptual framework, but also provides theoretical mechanisms to 
analyze and better understand the role that citizens’ play in the energy transition process. 
Second, existing research on the acceptance of policy instruments has either focused on 
citizens’ acceptance of single instruments (Carattini et al. 2016; Thalmann 2004) or on several 
instruments within a mix at the elite level (Ingold 2011), and both perspectives have typically 
failed to account for trade-offs or interdependencies within this potential mix. Hence, by 
combining both citizens’ perspective and instrument mix situations, we are able to gain new 
insights into how the political dimension drives or hinders changes in policies and instrument 
mixes and, ultimately, socio-technical transitions (Borras & Edler 2015). Third, empirically we 
propose an innovative approach to measure instrument mix preferences in the context of the 
Swiss energy turnaround. We thereby rely on novel survey data from Switzerland, where 
citizens had to indicate their preferences for various policy instruments promoting renewables 
to be introduced in their home canton (i.e., a sub-national entity). The estimations of 
multiresponse models enabled us to simultaneously analyze preferences for different policy 
instruments and, thus, to consider that preferences towards one specific policy instrument will 
also depend on what other instruments are available and preferred. Hence, this approach 
enabled us to conceptualize individual policy-mix preferences as a latent concept, which can 
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be measured by considering individual preferences towards different cantonal policy 
instruments.  
The case of Switzerland seems most suitable to study citizens’ policy-mix preferences. In 
federalist Switzerland, subnational legislation is subject to direct democracy, i.e., citizens’ 
acceptance of political decisions is actively required by ballot or passively by not calling for a 
referendum. In this context, the need to study citizens’ policy preferences is evident.  
The present paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce insights from social acceptance 
literature and the relevance of focusing on citizens as subjects of acceptance. Then, we derive 
hypotheses on what drives the acceptance of certain policy instruments in energy transitions. 
Next, we describe our case under investigation, the methods and the data used, before 
presenting our empirical results in the subsequent section. We conclude with a summary of 
our crucial findings and a discussion about the potential advantages of analyzing the 
acceptance of various policy instruments simultaneously, rather than isolating single 
instruments.   
2. Theory and concepts 
Although cultural properties, self-organized initiatives, or private action significantly 
contribute to larger societal transformations or socio-technical changes (Borras & Edler 2015; 
Geels 2002), recent studies have convincingly demonstrated that policies in general, and policy 
instruments in particular, are important pieces of the puzzle in the complex picture of 
sustainability transitions (Markard et al. this issue; 2016a; Kivimaa & Kern 2016). The 
formation of socio-technical change might involve several policy changes and instruments at 
different points in time and in diverse policy sectors (see Markard et al. 2012; Smith et al. 2005). 
This also means that new policy instruments are rarely introduced in an isolated way: they are 
introduced in addition to a pre-existing portfolio of policy instruments (Flanagan et al. 2011; 
Holzinger et al. 2006). This can be the result of a strategic application of the “logics of 
combination or succession” (Ingold et al. 2016) where instruments are introduced jointly or 
subsequently to better reach defined targets. Or policy instruments co-exist because of a lack 
of such design strategies and there is a missed opportunity for “constructive destruction” 
(Kivimaa & Kern 2016), where instruments aiming at a different policy goal are dismissed in 
favor of instruments targeting new policy goals (see also Burke & Stephens 2017). In 




This research is interested in how instruments are selected, integrated into or combined 
towards an instrument mix. We are thus in line with most recent studies investigating the 
impact of single instruments on other instrments in the same (Edmondson et al. 2018) and 
different areas (del Rìo & Cerdà 2017; Rosenow et al. 2017). Traditionally, research interested 
in policy decisions and instrument selection focuses on the political power-play among actors 
of the elite (Ingold 2011; Mills 1956), or on technocrats testing different alternatives in isolation 
from politics (Linder & Peters 1988). More recent studies integrate a wider array of actors 
involved in policy or socio-technical changes, such as  utilities, firms, governmental actors, 
state officials, and the so-called stakeholders (Fünfschilling & Truffer 2016; Ingold 2011; 
Bressers & O’Toole 2005; Geels 2002; Mills 1956). Nevertheless, we argue that there is another 
important group that is still largely neglected in these studies: the citizens. As we will discuss, 
citizens also play a crucial role with respect to the effective introduction and implementation 
of policies and instruments. Thus, we below outline insights from social acceptance literature 
and thereby integrate a citizens’ perspective into the transitions context. We thus define our 
dependent variable as the citizens’ acceptance of policy instruments promoting energy 
transitions (2.2), and present hypotheses derived from the combination of transitions and 
acceptance studies (2.3).  
2.1. Instrument acceptance at the citizens’ level 
Dermont et al., (2017) emphasize that the conceptualization of social acceptance always relates 
to a specific object of acceptance. In other words, the degree and drivers of acceptance depend 
on what citizens are supposed to accept. Hence, in the present study, this implies that citizens’ 
instrument acceptance may be contingent on the instrument type and how different 
instrument types are combined (i.e., the instrument mix). Policy instruments include different 
types such as bans, prescriptions, taxes, subsidies, certificates, limits, standards, information 
campaigns, voluntary measures, etc. Most often, policy instruments are categorized in one of 
three instrument types (Vedung 1998): regulative, incentive, and persuasive measures. From 
the first to the last, the degree of coercion of the target group typically decreases (Sager 2009). 
But coercion is only one of several criteria or logics that an instrument comes with. For 
instance, and in a preliminary phase of state intervention, soft tools such as persuasive and 
voluntary measures can serve the purpose of sensitizing target groups and increasing the 
legitimacy of a new policy strategy (Sterner 2003). In contrast, regulative and more coercive 
instruments are prominently introduced in situations where strong state intervention and an 
immediate policy impact is desired (Ingold et al. 2016). Finally, incentive measures follow a 
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market logic and are supported by those who want price mechanisms to regulate target 
groups’ behavior (Thalmann 2004).       
Generally speaking, most citizens are targeted by a large variety of policy instruments, and to 
render them effective, they need to comply with these instruments, accommodate new rules, 
and change their behavior (Dermont et al. 2017; Batel et al. 2013, Steg et al. 2005). Policy design 
and implementation, mainly at the local level, can further rely on the direct support of citizens 
(for example, if the introduction of a new instrument is subject to a direct-democratic decision). 
In this vein, most prominently, Wüstenhagen et al. (2007) have argued that a lack of social 
acceptance (also by citizens) can serve as an important hurdle to the implementation of 
(renewable energy) policy. Thus, based on the social acceptance literature, we conclude that 
the question of what policy instruments citizens accept in a instrument mix context is crucial 
for the larger energy transition. Moreover, and against the background that citizens’ 
acceptance and the conditions of acceptance heavily depend on what exactly needs to be 
accepted, a fine-grained perspective regarding different instrument types and the trade-offs 
between them needs to be considered.  
A number of studies have examined citizens and their acceptance of renewable energy policies 
or, more generally, environmental-friendly issues. A first group has suggested that the design 
features of a policy — i.e., its specific elements and also perceptions of distributive fairness, 
risks and benefits — influence how citizens react to a policy (e.g., Schuitema et al. 2011; 
Loukopoulos et al. 2005; Poortinga et al. 2005; see also del Rìo & Cerdà 2017). Another group 
of studies adopts a socio-psychological perspective and, thus, focuses on individual 
characteristics (Batel & Devine-Wright 2015; Huijts et al. 2012). In particular, pro-
environmental attitudes, environmental concerns, belief in human-induced climate change, or 
norms such as feeling an obligation to act in an environmentally-friendly manner have been 
identified as crucial triggers of policy acceptance (e.g., Shi et al. 2015; Lee et al. 2015; Karlstrøm 
& Ryghaug 2014; Loukopoulos et al 2005; Steg et al. 2005). A third and large group of studies 
has emphasized that the main problem is not citizens’ acceptance at a general—i.e., socio-
political—level, but rather that opposition tends to develop if these policies are materialized 
in specific contexts (e.g., Batel et al. 2013; Wüstenhagen et al. 2007; Bell et al. 2005; Devine-
Wright 2005; Wolsink 2006; 2000). In the following section we discuss the three perspectives in 
more detail and derive our hypotheses. We thereby  apply this research to the energy transition 





2.2. Three drivers for citizens’ instrument preferences in a instrument mix setting  
 
Individual values and convictions  
Previous research investigating the acceptance of (single) policy instruments has emphasized 
that actors’ preferences for and acceptance of policy instruments are strongly contingent on 
the priority and salience they attribute to the problem, and also depend on their interests, 
beliefs, ideologies, and strategies (Borrás & Edquist 2013; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993). At 
the citizens level, a similar argument can be derived based on the social acceptance literature. 
Assuming a socio-psychological perspective, extensive research has been conducted on 
individual characteristics and the propensity to be supportive of renewable energy policies in 
general and specific instruments in particular (Batel & Devine-Wright 2015; Dermont 2018; 
Huijts et al. 2012; Kammermann and Dermont 2018; Stadelmann-Steffen and Dermont 2018). 
In particular, research in this field has shown that high environmental concerns, particularly 
the acknowledgement of a human-environment relationship, affect how individuals 
evaluate—and, thus, to what degree accept—renewable energy policies or environmental-
friendly measures more generally (Kammermann and Dermont 2018; Lee et al. 2015; Shi et al. 
2015; Loukopoulos et al. 2005; Steg et al. 2005).  
These individual values and convictions may be particularly relevant with regard to far-
reaching and more coercive (but possibly effective) instruments that induce stronger effects on 
citizens, i.e., costs or constraints. Various studies have shown that citizens may be reluctant to 
accept renewable energy policies in general because, from a personal or household 
perspective, these instruments tend to generate visible short-term costs, whereas the benefits, 
i.e., better environmental quality, is much more diffuse and only materializes in the future – if 
at all (Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003; Stadelmann-Steffen and Dermont 2018). Thus, 
Stadelmann-Steffen and Dermont (2018), focusing on incentive-based instruments, argue that 
citizens need some kind of compensation to accept these costs. They also show that ideological 
values may play an important role in this context. In other words, for individuals with strong 
environmental concerns and for those who acknowledge human-induced climate change, 
effective instruments may produce a “ideological benefit”, which is able to to compensate for 
the costs of these instruments. 
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Based on these considerations, we argue that citizens in favor of a larger transition in a policy 
field have a greater tendency to accept new instruments in this field. We further hypothesize 
that for these transition advocates, renewable energy policies may have an “ideological 
benefit”, and thus these individuals are more likely to also accept more coercive instruments 
compared to citizens who are not advocates of a larger transition. 
H1a: Citizens tend to accept new instruments in a instrument mix situation when they are 
in favor of the larger transition in the political field.  
H1b: Citizens who are in favor of the larger transition in the political field are more likely 
to accept more coercive policy instruments and instrument mixes.  
 
Citizens’ as pro-sumers 
Policy formulation and implementation are highly intertwined processes. The role citizens 
may take on in policy implementation strongly impacts their position in formulating policy 
(Howlett & Lejano 2012). Similarly, the role they play in the established regime may impact 
their acceptance of solutions that still have niche characteristics. Thus, citizens may anticipate 
that they are being viewed as the future target group of a policy instrument, i.e., the addressees 
from whom a behavioral change is expected (Howlett et al. 2009). In general, target groups 
tend to prefer instruments that keep their costs low and their flexibility with respect to 
implementation as high as possible (Landry & Varone 2005).    
However, depending on the policy instrument to be introduced, such a pessimistic view about 
a target group’s preferences is not necessarily appropriate, as shown by social acceptance 
studies. Instruments like feed-in-tariff systems also can create opportunities and advantages 
for target groups. Recent technology development has enabled ordinary citizens to participate 
in the energy market as small decentralized producers of renewable electricity. For example, 
Wolsink (2013: 826) has argued: “By replacing the conventional consumer-producer 
relationship with multipronged relationships—the consumer co-producing and supplying for 
partners in the micro-grid as a distributed generator, and vice versa—entirely new 
relationships emerge.” Thus, the present study focuses on such innovative new relationships 
because as soon as traditional policy addressees become co-producers of the (public) service, 
the relationship between the state and these actors changes. Public and private actors begin to 
engage in a partnership-like interaction in which private actors can gain some personal 
benefits (in terms of money, return on investment, or others). All of this may enhance their 
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instrument acceptance in general, and incentive-based mechanisms in particular. The latter are 
favored particularly because of their economic character, which particularly target producers.    
H2a: Citizens tend to accept new instruments in a instrument mix situation when they 
assume the role of pro-sumers.   
H2a: Pro-sumers prefer incentive-based instruments and instrument mixes over 
persuasive and regulatory instruments.   
The existing policy context 
Different instruments may impact each other differently, depending on whether they are 
introduced simultaneously or subsequently, or at the same or different levels (Ingold et al. 
2016). When narrowing this premise to the level of citizens, preferences for new policy 
instruments may be contingent on what citizens already know from the context in which they 
live. On the one hand, generally, it can be assumed that citizens are more comfortable with 
accepting new instruments in a instrument mix situation if these new policies continue or 
strengthen the existing instrument mix. More precisely, citizens will be more likely to support 
new renewable energy (RE) instruments if they are embedded in a context (i.e., jurisdiction) 
that already exhibits a relatively comprehensive mix in this field (Rogge & Reichardt 2016; 
Sovacool 2009). This finding also is in accordance with previous research on the acceptance of 
RE policy, which has argued that public support “was always conditional to knowing, and 
understanding, the ‘bigger picture’” (Ricci et al. 2008: 5877) of a new policy or technology. For 
example, Carattini et al. (2016) have argued that citizens’ reluctance to support incentive-based 
ecological instruments is due to a lack of knowledge about how these instruments work. 
Similarily, it has been shown that prior (local) experience with a technology decreases 
opposition (Zoellner et al. 2008; Warren et al. 2005; Ek 2005). These described mechanisms are 
also in accordance with the observations that citizens tend to favor the well-known, i.e., the 
status quo, over new and seemingly insecure solutions (Mercer 2005; McDermott 2004; 
Kahneman & Tversky 1979). Hence, it can be expected that with respect to policy instruments 
and instrument mixes, citizens’ experiences with renewable energy policies in their 
environment, i.e., their home canton, influence their readiness to accept new instruments in 
this area. Moreover, if a canton has already installed a rather comprehensive instrument mix, 
citizens will be more likely to support further coercive instruments. 
H3a: Citizens tend to accept new instruments in a instrument mix situation when they 
live in a jurisdiction that already exhibits a comprehensive instrument mix.   
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H3b: Citizens are more likely to accept more coercive instruments and instrument mixes if 
they live in a canton that already exhibits a comprehensive instrument mix 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Case description and instrument selection  
After the Fukushima crisis in 2011, the Swiss government decided to begin a step-by-step 
phasing out of nuclear energy. This action requires that approximately 40% of Swiss electricity 
has to be replaced by alternative energy sources, or that energy savings and efficiency are 
required to help reduce consumption. One important pillar of the energy strategy 2050 (Swiss 
Confederation 2013), and thus the governmental program that concretizes the phasing out 
decision, is the promotion of RE sources in Switzerland. With respect to energy policy, the 
federalist structure attributes most competences to the subnational entities, the 26 cantons, 
which are involved in the design and implementation of national decisions. Currently, 26 
different cantonal instrument mixes are being used to promote RE. In the framework of the 
energy strategy 2050, in which targets for renewables are more ambitious, new cantonal 
instruments and an increasing variety of approaches among the cantons may be emerging.   
To account for this regional variance (for instance, see Hypothesis 3), we are interested in 
which instruments Swiss citizens prefer for the promotion of small-scale hydropower, wind, 
geothermal, and solar (PV) energy sources. We are not particularly interested in their 
preferences for one or several single instruments but, rather, want to examine what citizens 
accept in a instrument mix situation in which trade-offs and synergies among several 
instruments are possible. In line with the recent research evaluating policy designs and 
instruments (see for instance Schaffrin et al. 2015; Ingold 2011; Sager 2009), we focus on four 
different instruments that fulfill different characteristics or criteria (i.e., do not belong to the 
same instrument category; Vedung 1998), but also have a potential to be introduced in a 
combined way. These instruments include one persuasive instrument, two incentive 
instruments, and one regulative instrument, with their degree of coercion increasing from the 
first to the last: information and training for entrepreneurs, firms and citizens about how to 
construct and run RE projects; a tax relief and subsidies for the construction of renewable 
projects; and a ban on the construction of future non-renewable power plants. Although no 
canton has yet adopted the full portfolio of these four instruments, research on the more 
specific promotion of hydropower in the 26 Swiss cantons has shown that in a minority of 
cantons, a mix consisting of instruments belonging to the three mentioned categories can 
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already be observed (Kammermann 2017). This finding implies that such a mix is a realistic 
option and is not simply an artefact of our research.  
3.2. Data, methods, and research design  
Data  
We collected the data set used in this contribution in Switzerland between March and May 
2016. During this period, the first set of instruments to be used to implement the energy 
strategy 2050 were hotly debated in parliament. This conflict implied that in the context of our 
survey, the issue of RE promotion had received some media attention and had triggered a 
certain level of citizen discussion and involvement, although, from the citizens’ perspective, 
the debate was not yet public but was occurring mainly at the elite level. The actual campaign 
to promote RE occurred one year later, which led to the introduction of a new energy law in a 
referendum vote in May 2017. Thus, in our survey, we measured general policy preferences in 
the context of the larger energy turnaround and related socio-technical change (as present in a 
non-campaign context), which may not translate directly into support for one or another 
instrument in a real-world vote context (see Dermont et al. 2017). 
The trilingual survey4 on future energy provision in Switzerland collected 8,287 answers from 
a representative sample of the Swiss permanent resident population (i.e., including non-
citizens) provided by the Federal Office of Statistics, whereby respondents were invited by 
post to participate in an online survey.5  After three invites, the response rate was 41.7%. 
Twenty-five percent of the total sample, or 1,985 individuals, received a question module on 
cantonal policy instruments. Due to missing values, we excluded 150 observations. The 
sample, on which the following analysis is based, consists of 1,835 individuals.   
The demographic and structural composition of the sample used in the present study 
corresponds quite closely with the Swiss resident population (see Appendix), and is 
particularly true with respect to gender and education. Citizens older than 75 years are 
somewhat underrepresented, which is likely a result of the exclusive use of an online survey. 
In terms of political orientation, left-wing citizens are slightly overrepresented compared to 
the composition of Swiss voters according to the Swiss Election Study 2015 (Lutz 2016).  
                                                     
4 The survey was conducted in German, French, and Italian, the three larger of the four national languages of 
Switzerland: 65.4% completed the survey in German, 26.0% in French, and 8.6% in Italian. Romansh individuals 
likely used the German version to answer the survey.  
5 The LINK Institute in Lucerne conducted the data collection process, and the Federal Office of Statistics provided 
the sample of postal addresses from the “Stichprobenrahmen für Personen- und Haushaltserhebungen” (SRPH).   
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In the context of the present study, our crucial question was: “Which instruments, laws, and 
rules do you think the canton should enact to promote the construction of new [small-scale 
hydropower/wind energy/geothermal/solar power] plants. Please mark all options you 
would support:6   
 Stronger information, guidance, and education for persons who are interested in the 
construction of RE plants.  
 Tax relief for operators of RE power plants.  
 Subsidies for the construction of a new RE plant.  
 A ban on the construction of non-renewable electricity plans.”  
It is important to note that in the context of the present study, we cannot measure acceptance 
or even support for the different policy instruments and instrument mixes (Dermont et al. 2017; 
Batel et al. 2013). In other words, we acknowledge that based on the (always hypothetical) 
survey context and given that at the time of the survey a direct-democratic campaign or intense 
public debate was not being carried out, we cannot derive direct conclusions about how 
citizens would decide on these issues in a ballot vote. Hence, our results should be conceived 
of as citizens’ preferences (Dermont et al. 2017) that may  feed into and thus influence the early 
stages of the policy-making process, i.e., when different alternatives are still on the political 
agenda and are being discussed.   
 
Method  
We coded each of the four items as a dummy variable: the value of 1 was assigned if a 
respondent supported the policy instrument, whereas a zero meant that this instrument (item) 
was not selected. The respondents were randomly assigned to the four different energy 
sources (small-scale hydropower, wind, geothermal, and solar energy). In the analyses, we 
controlled for the different energy sources by integrating fixed effects, i.e., dummies for three 
sources, and wind energy as a reference category.  
Instead of estimating four different models in each one of the four dependent variables served 
as the dependent variable, we apply one multi-response model, i.e., a model with four 
dependent variables (Hadfield 2010). This approach enables us to analyze the individual 
support for the four instruments simultaneously. In statistical terms, the multi-response model 
                                                     
6 Beside the four options used in the present analyses, four others were available (public tenders; cantons and 
municipalities should invest themselves in the production of renewable energy; energy firms should be 
commissioned to construct new plants; nothing, renewable energies should not be promoted). 
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accounts for a potential covariance between the four dependent variables and their covariates 
(Hadfield 2010; Subramanian et al. 2005). In other words, the multi-response model takes into 
consideration that an individual response regarding one policy item is not independent from 
a response to the other policy items. On the one hand, correlated behavior between the 
different policy instruments can be expected, since individuals are characterized by varying 
general propensities to support cantonal RE instruments, which influences the probability of 
their supporting any of the instruments. Moreover, as discussed theoretically, the different 
policy instruments reflect different degrees of coercion, which suggests that an individual who 
supports a ban and incentives will most probably also favor less coercive instruments, e.g., 
information campaigns. Hence, it is very likely that response behavior regarding policy 
instruments is correlated, which needs to be considered in the model (Subramanian et al. 2005). 
On the other hand, and more importantly in our case, since respondents need to reflect on the 
different policy options (i.e., which instruments, but also how many) they would support or 
reject, we can mimic a instrument mix situation. In other words, the observed preference 
pattern can be considered to be a instrument mix preference. 7 In addition, we account for the 
fact that respondents live in different cantons and thus different policy contexts. To account 
for this hierarchical structure, we estimate hierarchical models.   
Finally, we apply a Bayesian estimation approach.8  Bayesian models have been found to 
perform better than maximum likelihood, particularly in logistic models with a small number 
of level 2 units (Stegmüller 2013; Browne & Draper 2006). For an easy interpretation of the 
Bayesian estimation results, we present the mean and the standard deviation of the posterior 
distribution, which can be interpreted in a way similar to a standard regression situation—the 
mean is the average effect of an independent variable on the outcome variable. Moreover, we 
provide the 90% credible intervals, which are the Bayesian equivalent to confidence intervals 
                                                     
7 It must be mentioned that respondents were not explicitly told that the questions were about instrument mixes, 
and they did not receive any explicit information on potential conflicts or interactions between some existing or 
new instruments. Although this approach might be a shortcoming of our measurement, the questions still ask 
respondents about what instruments and combinations of instruments they generally support (and which they do 
not). Moreover, providing respondents with a list of options encouraging them to think about how many 
instruments in total they would want to be realized (or to what extent RE should be promoted). Hence, by providing 
information on individual preferences for different instruments and on instrument combinations, as well as the 
number of supported instruments, our measurement approach captured two crucial aspects of instrument mix 
preferences.   
8  A fully Bayesian analysis requires the specification of priors for the unknown parameters. We used non-
informative normal priors ~N(0, 108) for the fixed effect parameters, and inverse Wishart priors ~W1(2, 2) for the 
variance component. We estimated all models in R using the package MCMCglmm (Hadfield 2010). We let the 
respective models run for 500’000 iterations, with a respective burn-in of 400’000 and a thinning of 10. Diagnostics 
based on the graphical inspection of the trajectories and the autocorrelations, and Geweke diagnostics led to the 
conclusion that the chains have mixed well and converged.   
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in a standard regression context. If this interval does not include zero, a given ‘effect’ can be 
considered as systematic, i.e., ‘significant.’  
Operationalization  
Our crucial independent variables with respect to the individual level are citizens’ attitudes 
regarding nuclear phasing out and climate change (Hypotheses 1a and 1b), and whether a 
respondent is a pro-sumer of renewable electricity (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). The variable 
nuclear phasing out is a Likert scale (1 to 4) where high values indicate a preference for phasing 
out. The variable climate change consists of four items that capture whether an individual thinks 
that climate change is indeed happening and human made, or whether she/he questions the 
existence of climate change (Tabi & Wüstenhagen 2015). High values stand for the perception 
that climate change is a realistic issue, whereas low values indicate climate change skepticism. 
The standardized Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.7, which implies that the internal consistency of the 
four variables is reasonably high. The acknowledgement of human-induced climate change 
and support for nuclear phasing out do not necessarily go together. In fact, an individual may 
believe in climate change but not support nuclear phasing-out, since nuclear energy may be 
perceived as a reasonable option (compared to fossil energy) for limiting climate change. Since 
we integrate the two variables separately in our analysis, our models can account for 
independent and even varying effects of the two constructs. Moreover, we define pro-sumers 
as those respondents who indicated that they produced renewable electricity or had a stake in 
RE production.  
At the contextual level, our crucial explanatory variable is the current instrument mix 
(Hypotheses 3a and 3b). Thus, we coded cantonal policy instruments regarding small-scale 
hydropower, wind power, or solar energy (PV) (reference year 2015). Currently, these three 
technologies are the most promising RE technologies for the Swiss market (SFOE 2013). Other 
sources such as geothermal energy or biomass are still of marginal relevance, and  regulators 
have given them little attention.9 To assess policy comprehensiveness, we first identified all 
policy instruments used to promote these three technologies. Second, we assessed the 
instrument mixes according to density (number of instruments present) and intensity (e.g., the 
amount of resources used, strictness of standards, etc.) (Knill & Tosun 2012; see also, e.g., 
Kammermann 2017 or Metz 2017). Cantons with little to no instruments promoting these three 
                                                     
9 Prominently missing among these other sources is large-scale hydropower (mega-dams), which  currently is about 
60 percent of Swiss electricity production. Our study does not focus on this technology because it is already a well-




sources receive a value of 0. Cantons that employ a broad variety of instruments—from 
information to subsidies and regulatory standards—and that coordinate their efforts with 
other policy fields such as environmental protection or construction receive the maximum 
value of 1. We calibrated values between 0 and 1 with .25 increments. Based on these 
evaluations, we also created a dummy variable with a value of 1 if a canton comprehensively 
promoted (>= 0.5) at least one source. This approach accounted for the fact that most cantons—
depending on physical conditions and other factors—promote one energy source, but not all 
together. For example, a canton may have a high potential for small-scale hydropower, but not 
for wind or solar energy. Hence, this canton will concentrate on promoting small-scale 
hydropower, but will probably refrain from making a significant investment in other energy 
sources.   
In the context of Hypotheses 3 testing, we also wish to outline some thoughts about timing 
and our research perspective. Hypothesis 3 expresses our expectation that instruments that 
were introduced in the past have an impact on current instrument preferences. More generally 
speaking, we acknowledge that policies might be one important means of raising awareness 
and inducing behavioral change towards transitions. Thus, conceptually, this implies that our 
analysis involves procedural aspects and elements with dynamic characteristics. 
Unfortunately, however, we are not able to explicitly grasp these dynamics based on our cross-
sectional and, thus, static data. However, by measuring the cantonal instrument mix one year 
before the citizens’ survey took place, we are able to establish – at least conceptually – 
causality, i.e., citizens responses are supposed to be influenced by what has been done before 
and thus, what exists in the respective canton.  
Finally, we account for further individual characteristics that are expected to affect individual 
preferences for RE policy in general, and instrument mix in particular. These variables are: 
gender (ref. cat.: female), age (ref. cat.: 18—30 years old), education (ref. cat.: medium 
education), whether an individual has children or not, and political ideology (ref.cat.: no 
political ideology).  
Additional information on the variables, their operationalization, and descriptive statistics can 
be found in the Appendix. 
4. Analysis and Results   
In this section, we present our empirical results. Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
acceptance rates of the four instruments. The graph shows that subsidies are most popular, 
with 45.6% of the respondents supporting this instrument at the cantonal level. Information 
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and tax reliefs exhibit a somewhat lower acceptance rate of 38.5% and 37.6%, respectively, 
whereas bans are only supported by roughly a quarter of the respondents. Although  none of 
the instruments receive a majority support, a clear majority favors some kind of policy 
intervention (i.e., supports at least one of the four instruments; see also Table 2). 
Moreover, Table 1 demonstrates that individual responses regarding the acceptance of the four 
instruments are, for the most part, significantly correlated, although not very strongly. This 
finding lends support to the validity of our conceptualization of instrument mix preferences. 
On the one hand, the significant correlations confirm that individual responses regarding the 
different policy instruments are not independent from each other. Methodologically, this 
means that multiresponse models that account for this dependence are the right choice. 
Substantially, the positive correlation indicates that citizens who support one instrument are 
also more likely to support another, i.e., a certain propensity exists for instrument (not) 
support. On the other hand however, the rather small correlation coefficients also reveal that 
citizens do not support or reject all instruments automatically, but rather, they differentiate 
between instruments and specifically choose one but not necessarily others. Hence, citizens 
have varying preferences for how instruments are combined (including the possibility of 
rejecting any instrument promoting RE)—in other words, citizens prefer different instrument 
mixes. More substantially, whereas citizens who support information also tend to accept the 
three other instruments, market-oriented policies (subsidies and tax reliefs) are not correlated 
significantly with bans. These descriptive results may reflect the fact that the instrument 
‘information’ is mainly supported by citizens to (in a soft way) promote RE. Conversely, 
market-based instruments that are targeted at firms also can be supported by citizens for 
economic rather than environmental reasons, which leads to higher overall acceptance rates.10 
Furthermore, a ban on energy production from non-RE sources is the most coercive 
instrument, which only a minority of citizens is ready to support.   
 
                                                     
10 Unfortunately, we are not able to empirically distinguish between the varying motivations for preferences of a 
specific instrument.  
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Figure 1: Acceptance rates of policy instruments.  
 
Note: Share of respondents (in %) indicating that the canton should use the respective instrument to 
promote RE. N = 1835. 
 
Table 1: Correlations between policy instruments 
 Information Subsidy Tax relief Ban 
Information 1    
Subsidy 0.17 1   
Tax relief 0.13 0.28 1  
Ban 0.12 0.02 0.00 1 
Note: Pearson’s correlations (Phi coefficients) between individual responses per instrument. 
Grey = p-value is below 0.05 (significant at the 95% level). N = 1835. 
 
Table 2: Frequency of preferred instrument mixes 
 Number of respondents % 
None 400 21,8% 
subsidy and tax relief 169 9,2% 
only subsidy 165 9,0% 
All but ban 156 8,5% 
only information 135 7,4% 
Only ban 118 6,4% 
Information and subsidy 120 6,5% 
only tax relief 119 6,5% 
All 77 4,2% 
Information and ban 74 4,0% 
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Information and tax relief 65 3,5% 
Subsidy and ban 60 3,3% 
All but tax relief 58 3,2% 
All but information 51 2,8% 
All but subsidy 37 2,0% 
Tax relief and ban 31 1,7% 
Total 1835 100% 
Note: Frequencies of individual instrument mixes. 
Hence, by supporting one but not other instruments, citizens indicate their ‘personal’ 
instrument mix preference for their canton. This conclusion is further supported by the results 
in Table 2, which depict varying response patterns and their frequencies.  These results provide 
further evidence about the instrument mix citizens prefer: 23.5% of the respondents do not 
support any instrument to promote RE, whereas 28.7% prefer the promotion of only one of the 
four instruments. In contrast, roughly half of the surveyed citizens prefer a mix. A general 
observable trend exists that comprehensive and coercive mixes are the least preferred 
categories, whereas a market-oriented promotion, mostly in combination with soft tools 
(information), is the most widely accepted mix.  
Subsequently, to test our hypotheses, based on the multi-response regression models, we more 
systematically investigate to what extent individual and cantonal characteristics can explain 
these preferences with respect to cantonal policy instruments.  
Figure 2 presents our basic model in which the four instruments (items) regarding cantonal 
(i.e., sub-national) promotion of renewables serve as dependent variables. A first and 
important observation, also in line with the descriptive findings above, is that the results are 
not identical across the four different policy instruments.11 For example, citizens with a rightist 
political ideology—compared to citizens who do not locate themselves politically—more 
strongly prefer incentive-based instruments, whereas this pattern does not occur in relation to 
information and a ban on non-RE. Similarly, respondents with children more often opt for tax 
reliefs and subsidies, while exhibiting lower preferences for information than their childless 
counterparts. Finally, although education is not related systematically to preferences for tax 
reliefs, information, and a ban, highly educated citizens tend to opt for subsidies more 
                                                     
11 However, further models that included the response variables to predict the three other responses (i.e., path 
models) revealed that the four responses significantly correlate with each other (the only exception is that 
preferences for tax reliefs are not related systematically to preferences for a ban). This finding can be interpreted to 





frequently than respondents with lower education. These results once more imply that our 
dependent variables not only capture a general propensity to support cantonal RE 
instruments, but also that citizens can and do distinguish between different instruments. In 
other words, citizens do select different instrument mixes when asked about what cantonal 
policy instruments should be implemented.   
When moving to our crucial explanatory variables at the individual level, we observe that 
attitudes towards nuclear phasing out are related to individual instrument mix preferences 
(with the exception of tax reliefs, the coefficients are systematically different from zero). Most 
importantly, citizens who support nuclear phasing out exhibit a strong preference for 
regulatory instruments, i.e., a ban on non-renewable electricity production. This strong 
relationship may reflect that the ban on nuclear power plants is one of the most prominent 
examples for this policy instrument. However, these citizens also more frequently and 
systematically support information and subsidies, whereas preferences for nuclear phasing 
out are unrelated to support for tax reliefs. With respect to climate change skepticism, the same 
pattern can be observed, although the strength of the estimated effects is roughly equally 
strong for information, subsidies, and bans. Hence, from these results we conclude that—as 
proposed in Hypotheses 1a and 1b—citizens who are in favor of a larger transition in the 
political field, i.e., who believe in human-induced climate change and/or support nuclear 
phasing out, generally have a higher propensity to support cantonal RE policies (confirmation 
of Hypothesis 1a) and display a tendency to prefer more coercive over less coercive policy 
instruments (confirmation of Hypothesis 1b). Most importantly, these citizens opt for a 
instrument mix that bans non-RE production and also includes information and subsidies.   
Hypothesis 2 focuses on the so-called pro-sumers, i.e., citizens who are not only consumers of 
electricity, but moreover contribute to the production of RE either as producers (e.g., who have 
solar collectors on their roofs) or investors. Interestingly, even though these citizens have a 
stake in RE policy, they generally do not support new cantonal policy instruments more 
strongly than other citizens (rejection of Hypothesis 2a). However, and as hypothesized, pro-
sumers are characterized by a systematically stronger preference for both subsidies and tax 
reliefs (in accordance with Hypothesis 2b). This finding can be interpreted as private 
individual producers showing solidarity for large-scale producers, i.e., they support 
instrument mixes that focus on economic incentives for RE production.   
In a next step, we analyze whether the existing cantonal instrument mix for the field of RE 
policy affects citizens’ preferences regarding new cantonal instruments (Hypotheses 3a and 
3b). These models demonstrate that a systematic relationship does not exist between the 
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cantonal policy context and individual instrument mix preferences. None of our four 
instrument mix variables (i.e., an overall cantonal energy strategy containing RE policy 
instruments, and the specific promotional cantonal policy with respect to small-scale 
hydropower, wind, and PV; see section 3.2 for more detailed information about the four 
variables) is related systematically to the level of support for the four policy instruments (see 
Figure 3 for the example of the cantonal energy strategy). Moreover, the deviance information 
criterion (DIC) indicates that the more parsimonious model—i.e., without the cantonal 
context—is the preferred model.  
As mentioned previously, we randomly assigned the respondents to four different energy 
sources. In other words, their responses reflect their preferences regarding instrument mix 
with regard to small-scale hydropower, wind, geothermal, or solar energy, respectively. Thus, 
we also estimate further models in which we interact the cantonal policy variables with the 
energy sources. By so doing, we are able to test whether, for example, an extensive cantonal 
instrument mix in the area of small-scale hydropower affects individual preferences regarding 
policies in this area. However, these additional analyses do not reveal any systematic 
relationship between cantonal policy variables and individual instrument mix preferences.  
Although our data does not support Hypothesis 3, this finding does not necessarily mean that 
the cantonal context, i.e., the status quo, is unrelated to individual preferences regarding 
cantonal instrument mixes. We conclude, however, that the institutional indicators we used to 
capture cantonal energy policy might be too abstract to influence individual preferences. On 
the one hand, most citizens’ may just not know what policy their home canton has put in place. 
On the other hand, institutional indicators are not visible to citizens in their daily life. Both 
aspects make a close association unlikely between these cantonal instrument mix variables and 




Figure 2: Individual instrument mix preferences.  
 
 
Note: Hierarchical, logistic multi-response, Bayesian estimation using MCMCglmm in R. The mean 
and the 95% credible interval of the log odds are presented. For illustrative purposes, we multiplied 
the coefficient of the variable climate change by 10. N = 1835. DIC = 9150. 8.  
 
  




Note: Log odds and 95% credible interval of the cantonal energy policy on preferences for the four 
instruments. Model as presented in Figure 2 additionally includes the cantonal energy policy. The other 




5. Discussion and Conclusion   
In this study, we investigated the factors that drive citizens’ acceptance of new policy 
instruments, which are to be added to a pre-existing instrument mix in the case of an ongoing 
transition in the energy sector. We argue that citizens’ acceptance is one relevant criterion with 
respect to examining policy instruments, since citizens may become the target group of a large 
variety of policy instruments introduced by different jurisdictions at different levels. In a 
narrow sense, their acceptance is crucial for instrument support at the ballot, and their later 
implementation. More broadly speaking, citizens’ acceptance may lead to important policy 
change, which subsequently contributes to larger socio-technical change.   
We focused on energy policy and the energy transition in Switzerland. For our analyses, we 
relied on data gathered through a citizens’ survey, which asked respondents about their 
preferences for four instruments (information, tax relief, subsidies, or bans) to support small-
scale hydropower, wind, and solar energy. One main contribution of this approach is that we 
did not focus on policy instruments separately, but presented them in a instrument mix 
situation and in relation to the pre-existing instrument mix. The first aspect accounts for the 
fact that policy instruments do not exist and are not introduced in isolation, but rather along 
with other instruments, i.e., a instrument mix. For individual preferences this means that the 
resulting interactions and potential trade-offs need to be considered. The second aspect (i.e, 
relating preferences back to the existing mix), emphasizes a dynamic perspective of energy 
transitions: it is not only about the cause-effect relationship between instruments and how they 
attempt to realize predefined sustainability targets, but also about the policy process and 
dynamics related to how instruments are accepted and are later selected in relation to a pre-
existing mix. This aspect has implications for how the energy transition may evolve and be 
achieved. Based on our cross-sectional data, we were only partly able to capture these 
procedural aspects empirically, thus, future research should investigate these dynamic 
elements more specifically, ideally adopting longitudinal data gathering and treatment. 
Our analyses initially revealed that, among citizens, subsidies are the most preferred 
instrument, followed by information, taxes, and bans. Moreover, and importantly, citizens do 
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not express preferences in favor of one, and against other instruments. This is therefore an 
indicator that citizens acknowledge that only a instrument mix, i.e., a combination of 
instruments, might address the issue of future energy policy.  
Our results further imply that there is no consistent association between the level of 
coerciveness of instruments and public support. Although, overall, bans are the least accepted 
instruments in the instrument mix (Table 1), the degree of state intervention and coerciveness 
with respect to the target group is not the only or most relevant criterion influencing citizens 
to reject (as opposed to accept) an instrument, rather, individual factors, in particular, produce 
more nuanced preference patterns.  
In this vein, information is most likely to be accepted by those citizens favoring nuclear 
phasing out, and those voting for center or left parties. Tax reliefs are preferred by citizens 
with children, and by those with a clear partisan ideology (being left or right). The same is true 
for subsidies, but this instrument is also particularly preferred by advocates of nuclear phasing 
out and effective climate change policy. The two latter groups, and also supporters of left 
parties, are most likely to opt for bans, the most coercive instrument in the mix.  
We are thus able to empirically corroborate Hypothesis 1, suggesting that individual values 
and convictions (support for nuclear phasing out and climate change mitigation) influence 
preferences for policy instruments in a policy-mix situation and, particularly, support for more 
coercive instruments. This is an interesting result because it speeks to the literature finding 
evidence that deeper values and convictions impact policy preferences and political behavior 
(Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Thus, if policy change is crucial for larger socio-technical change, 
and if both strongly depend upon values, convictions and world-views, the question arises of 
how to impact or alter these values and the underlying ideologies. In this context, different 
perspectives exist: while some authors acknowledge that actors included in policy processes 
might be able to learn over time (Sabatier 1986), others argue that an external shock is needed 
in order to induce ideological, policy, and ultimately more radical, change (Birkland 1998). The 
process under study in this paper was definitely impacted by the Fukushima crises, which can 
be interpreted as a focusing event and external shock. We thus conclude that using windows 
of opportunity that open after shocks or focusing events, as well as providing citizens with 
adequate information, seems crucial for shaping citizens’ preferences.  
We also found empirical support for Hypothesis 2, which states that pro-sumers are more 
strongly in favor of market-based instruments than bans. Thus, citizens who perceive 
themselves as potential investors and co-producers of alternative energies have a greater 
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tendency to accept tax reliefs and subsidies over other instruments, and support them more 
strongly than other citizens who are not potential investors or co-producers. 
Hypothesis 3 assumed that citizens living in a jurisdiction with an already comprehensive 
instrument mix tend to accept new instruments more strongly than others who do not live in 
a similar jurisdiction. We did not find clear results for this assumption. The comprehensiveness 
of an already introduced instrument mix in a region or jurisdiction is not, in a general and 
systematic way, related to individual preferences. However, we have used an institutional 
indicator to capture these cantonal policy contexts, which may not be very visible for citizens. 
Therefore, further research should more thoroughly reflect on how to measure an existing 
instrument mix in a way that can capture actual individual perceptions of and experiences 
with a jurisdiction’s energy policy. 
Our study has shown that personal characteristics and attitudes play an important role in 
influencing individual instrument mix preferences. To push towards an energy transition, 
policy makers are well-advised to enable citizens’ participation and to hear their concerns, but 
also  to sensitize citizens about the “bigger picture” and thus increase the legitimacy of the 
energy transition. The latter seems to be an important precondition for citizens to accept 
instruments that are stronger and more coercive. Our research design has also revealed the 
relevance of including the citizens’ perspective when studying larger transition processes. 
However, more research is needed to disentangle the relative contribution of citizens to policy 
change, compared to firms, scientific institutions, or the political elite. A combination of 
sophisticated survey methods and data analysis, as presented here, with in-depth case 
knowledge, qualitative and longitudinal data assessment seems to be a fruitful path for future 
research.  
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Table A.1: Variables, summary statistics, and operationalization 
Variable   Operationalization 
Dependent variables Sample Population  


















 Which instruments, laws, or rules do you think the canton should use to promote the construction of solar/wind/small-scale 
hydropower/geothermal power plants? Please tick all options you agree with: 
 Stronger information, guidance, and education for persons interested in the construction of RE plants.  
 Tax reliefs for operators of RE plants.  
 Subsidies for the construction of a new RE plant.  
 A ban on the construction of non-renewable electricity plants.  
Explanatory variables    
Pro-sumer Pro-sumer: 8.8% 
No pro-sumer: 91.2% 
 Dummy variable with a value of 1 if a respondent indicates that she/he invests in RE, for example, by producing RE or by having a 
stake in a RE site. All other respondents are assigned the value 0. 




 Additive index based on four items (all items have been recoded so high values indicate that respondents think that anthropogenic 
climate change exists, whereas low values stand for climate scepticism): 
1) I am not sure whether climate change is really happening. 
2) Climate change is mainly anthropogenic. 
3) The consequences of climate change are dramatized. 
4) Climate change is an excuse to patronize citizens and raise taxes. 




 In the Energy Strategy 2050, the Federal Council proposes nuclear phasing out. What do you think about this proposition? 
Four-point Likert scale: (5) Agree, (4) Rather agree, (3) Don’t know, (2) Rather disagree, (1) Disagree 
 




Gender dummy: 1 = male (reference category), 0 = female.   
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Three education categories: Lower Secondary (reference category), Higher Secondary, Tertiary. 








Four age categories: younger than 31 years (reference category), 31–45 years old, 46–65 years old, older than 65 years. 








Four political self-placement categories: left, middle, right, no position (reference category). 
Children in household Has children: 31.2% 
No children: 68.8% 
 Dummy: 1 = with children, 0 = without children (reference category). 




 Indicator of cantonal instrument mix in wind energy (0–1). High values stand for a high density and inclusiveness, whereas low 
values mean an absence of a comprehensive instrument mix.  
Cantonal solar power Mean: 0.51 
S.D.: 
Min.: 0  
Max.: 1 
 Indicator of cantonal instrument mix in solar energy (0–1). High values stand for a high density and inclusiveness, whereas low 
values mean an absence of a comprehensive instrument mix. 




 Indicator of cantonal instrument mix in water energy (0–1). High values stand for a high density and inclusiveness, whereas low 
values mean an absence of a comprehensive instrument mix. 
Instrument mix 1: 45.6% 
0: 44.4% 
 Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a comprehensive instrument mix exists in at least one energy area. 
 
